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Abstract_______________________________________________________________ 
Argentina has slipped from being among the ten richest countries in the world by the eve of 
World War I to its current position close to developing countries. What did originate Argentina’s 
economic retardation?. In this paper we employ a structural model to investigate the extent to 
which institutional instability, as captured by “Contract Intensive Money” (Clague, Keefer, 
Knack and Olson, 1999), conditioned capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina 
and, consequently, the country’s relative international position. Our results suggest that 
institutional instability played a major role in Argentina’s unique historical experience of 
economic decline. 
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How has Argentina, a country which occupied a position among the ten richest countries 
in the world in terms of income per capita in the period 1880-1929, slipped to its current place in 
the ranking, closer to that of Turkey than to Western Europe’s?. 
Argentina began to lose ground compared with Australia and Canada, countries whose 
development was also largely due to the exploitation of natural resources and the exports of 
staple goods, in the late nineteenth century1. That is, before the dates (the First World War, the 
Great Depression and the post-World War II era) with which, up to now, economic historians 
signaled the beginning of Argentina’s retardation2. However, it was not until the last quarter of 
the twentieth century that she fell behind definitively. Why was Argentina not able to catch up 
with Australia and Canada during the 20th century? What was the origin of Argentina’s 
backwardness? These questions still await a definitive answer.  
Investment, as a means of rising capital intensity, is, according to the neo-classical 
explanation of growth, the way to increase output per person. However, the increase of both 
human and physical capital depends, ultimately, on the existence of a set of incentives provided 
by the existing institutions (North, 1990: 134). In this paper we investigate the extent to which 
institutional instability conditioned capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina and, 
consequently, the country’s relative position to Australia and Canada.  
How to measure the connections between institutions, investment and growth represents a 
major challenge3. Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson (1999) suggested a way of measuring 
compliance with contracts and the security of property rights, which they define as “contract 
intensive money” [henceforth, CIM] and is equal to the percentage of deposits in the money 
supply (M2). The idea behind this indicator is that the way financial assets are held depends on 
the definition of property rights. When economic agents think they are operating in a stable 
context, in which property rights are well defined and guaranteed, it is not risky to keep assets in 
deposit accounts and, consequently, cash becomes a less attractive option. Consequently the 
proportion of deposits in the money supply will tend to increase. Increased compliance with 
contracts will encourage investment and, in consequence, lead to a higher rate of growth. The 
opposite situation would be caused by a poorly defined institutional framework.  
                                                 
1 These results are from the study of the relative series of GDP per capita between 1875 and 1990 using the unit root 
method and structural breaks. Cf. Sanz Villaroya (2005) 
2 Cf. Cortés Conde (1997), Di Tella and Zymelman (1973), Díaz Alejandro (1970), Ferrer (1996), Taylor (1992, 
1994, 1998b). 
3 North (1990), p. 107 writes: “We cannot see, feel, touch, or even measure institutions; they are constructs of the 
human mind”. Cf Knack and Keefer (1995) for an attempt to prove this relationship empirically. 
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In our essay we notice that the CIM measure is closely associated to economic freedom, 
political stability, and financial development, and we interpret it as an indicator of institutional 
stability and security of property rights. The association between institutional stability, 
investment and growth in Argentina over the long run is investigated with a system of structural 
equations. Our results suggest that the degree of institutional instability played a major role in 
Argentina’s unique historical experience of economic decline. 
 In the rest of the paper we discuss the origins of Argentina’s comparative backwardness 
against existing interpretations (section 2), examine CIM as our measure of institutional stability 
(section 3) and trace its development in Argentina over more than a century (section 4). We also 
estimate the determinants of growth using a structural model which includes CIM (section 5); 
finally, we carry out a simulation to identify what the effect on Argentina’s growth and position 
relative to Australia and Canada would have been if institutional stability in Argentina had been 
closer to that of these two countries (section 6).  
 
The relative position of Argentina 
Argentina, Australia and Canada are often compared as they are all considered areas of 
new settlement, countries which became exporters of primary goods under British influence and 
followed similar paths between the end of the nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. 
These large, scarcely populated countries were blessed with supplies of natural resources which 
gave them a privileged international position despite the fact that they were geographically 
distant from the centers of economic activity (Gallo, 1983; Duncan and Fogarty, 1984; Platt and 
Di Tella, 1986). 
Graph 1 presents Argentina’s performance relative to Australia and Canada, in terms of 
product per person (expressed as its difference in natural logarithms). We have used purchasing 
power parity adjusted GDP per capita expressed in 1913 US relative prices for the period 1875-
1939, and 1980 US relative prices for the period 1940-20014. The levels of real product per 
person for 1913 and 1980 are taken from Prados de la Escosura (2000). The volume indices used 
to project these benchmarks back and forth over for the whole period are taken from Maddison 
(2003), except for the period 1875-1935 in Argentina, for which we used Roberto Cortés Conde’s 
(1997) reconstruction of GDP.  
                                                 
4 This procedure attempts to mitigate the index number problem caused by using real product per capita series 
expressed in relative prices of a distant benchmark year. This is the case with Maddison’s (2003) figures in 1990 
dollars, which are normally used in this type of comparison. Nevertheless, the use of Maddison’s (1995, 2003) data 
does not significantly affect the results obtained (Sanz-Villarroya, 2005).  
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Argentina caught up rapidly with Australia and Canada until the end of the century when 
Argentina’s relative position began to stagnate and the decline set in (although occasionally 
drawing level with Canada until the 1930s). A significant, negative structural break took place in 
1974 after which Argentina fell further and further behind (Sanz-Villarroya, 2005). 
Why was Argentina not able to maintain its relative position to Australia and Canada? 
What was the cause of Argentina’s progressive decline?, are recurrent questions which historians 
and economists have been trying to answer for some time. 
The origins of Argentina’s backwardness have been the object of much attention. The 
definitive closing of the frontier was, according to Di Tella and Zymelman (1967), the main 
difference between Argentina and the other areas of new settlement as Argentina did not seek 
adequate alternatives to compensate for the end of geographical expansion. In Solberg’s (1985) 
opinion, the most important difference was the fact that while in Canada the policy of land 
distribution led to a situation with a large number of small farmers, in Argentina the result was a 
small number of landowners each with large areas of land5. Duncan and Fogarty (1984) argued 
that the contrast between the stable, flexible government of Australia and the bad government of 
Argentina is the key difference. According to Platt and Di Tella (1985) the political tradition and 
immigration from different regions were the key factors, while Díaz Alejandro (1985) suggested 
that a restrictive immigration policy, similar to Australia’s, would have increased productivity 
encouraged by the relative scarcity of labor6. 
Taylor (1992) pointed that the relatively high dependency rate and the slow demographic 
transition in Argentina led to lower savings rates than in Australia and Canada. Much of the 
capital entering the country would do so as a reaction to such low savings rates (Taylor and 
Williamson, 1994). Argentina depended on foreign capital, so the First World War and the 
subsequent ‘de-globalization’ reduced the capital inflow and had a negative impact on both 
capital formation and economic growth, giving rise to the beginning of Argentina’s historical 
backwardness. In fact, between 1900 and 1929, Argentina’s savings rate was around 10 percent 
lower than that of Australia and Canada and her dependency rate was 5 percent higher (Taylor, 
1992: 922). Taylor estimated that, in the long term, around two thirds of the difference between 
the savings rates in Argentina and Australia was due to the difference between their relative 
                                                 
5 However, an open land market existed in Argentina where many more immigrants than generally believed became 
farmers (Sánchez-Alonso, 2004a). Gallo (1983) argued that lack of capital and agricultural knowledge made 
advantageous for immigrants to become tenant farmers. Cf. Adelman (1994) for a qualified assessment of Solberg’s 
views. 
6 Cf Timmer and Williamson (1998) on the different migration policies applied in the ‘areas of new settlement’ and 
Sánchez-Alonso’s (2004b) reply for the situation in Latin America. 
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dependency rates. If Argentina’s dependency rate had been similar to the average of those of 
Australia and Canada, her savings rate would have doubled (Taylor, 1992: 925). 
In the Interwar, the main difference appears to have been the industrialization policy, 
which, in Argentina, encouraged import substitution in contrast with the export led growth 
favored by Canada. Taylor (1994, 1998a) observed that, from the thirties onwards, the 
accumulation of capital was hampered by the relatively high prices of (mostly imported) capital 
goods, which was the result of an industrial policy of import substitution. Multiple exchange 
rates, the black market for foreign currencies, the depreciation of the national currency and high 
customs tariffs were the underlying distorting factors behind the high relative prices of capital 
goods (Taylor, 1998b; Collins and Williamson, 2001). The resultant lower capital intensity, in 
turn, would explain the lower rates of labor productivity achieved by Argentina in comparison 
with Australia and Canada. In short, the institutional framework appears as the ultimate cause of 
Argentina’s historical backwardness (Cortés Conde, 1998).  
 
Measuring Institutional Stability  
In an attempt to define the institutional framework and measure its influence, Clague, 
Keefer, Knack and Olson (1999) proposed an indicator known as ‘Contract Intensive Money’ 
(CIM) which represents the money kept in deposits as a proportion of the money supply: 
                                           CIM = (M2-C)/M2                                          (I) 
where C is currency outside banks and M2 is the money supply including current and term 
deposits. 
 The rationale behind this indicator is that when economic agents trust that contracts will 
be respected and operate in an environment they believe to be safe, they hold a larger proportion 
of their money as deposits, so the CIM indicator tends to increase (Clague et al., 1999: 188). CIM 
measures the proportion of transactions that rely on third-party enforcement and, hence, provides 
an indicator of the security of property rights. If contracts are enforced, a favorable atmosphere 
for investment is created. In this environment the rate of capital formation will tend to rise, 
leading to economic growth. It follows that there should be a positive association between CIM, 
the investment rate and growth.  
Is CIM simply another measure of financial development or, as Clague et al. (1999) 
argue, is it really an objective measure of institutional quality?7. In order to check their 
                                                 
7 Cf. Sylla and Rousseau (2003) for the long-run connections between financial development and growth. 
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hypothesis, Clague et al. (1999: 204) use factorial analysis to show that a group of institutional 
indicators which includes measures of political and civil freedom, degree of definition of 
property rights and of the frequency of revolutions and coups d’état, has a heavier load in factor 1 
(in which CIM doubles its absolute value in factor 2), while financial development variables 
appear in factor 2. They conclude that CIM is mainly a measure of property rights enforcement. 
An exceptional scenario for CIM contemplated by Clague et al. (1999) is that of 
hyperinflation. As high inflation usually leads to increases in interest rates, economic agents 
would prefer time deposit accounts (including those in foreign currency) which would lead to an 
increase in CIM. This seems to be the case of Argentina between 1975 and 1990, when inflation 
went beyond 50 percent annually while real interest rates experienced a sharp increase, leading to 
a increase of CIM. Under these circumstances, CIM stops being an indicator of institutional 
stability. Therefore, our analysis is confined to the pre-hyperinflation era.  
Another scenario that would weaken CIM as a measure of institutional quality is if it 
could be seen as a measure of savings, so the higher the interest rate, the larger the proportion of 
the money supply in deposits. In such case it would not be surprising to find an association 
between CIM and the rate of investment. We found, however, that CIM is a good predictor of the 
different components of capital formation that do not necessarily have a high correlation with 
savings rates and, hence, rejected this scenario for the case of Argentina8. 
Is there a link between the CIM indicator and citizens’ degree of confidence in the 
institutional stability of Argentina over the long run?.  Graphs 2 presents the evolution of CIM in 
Argentina between 1863 and 1974, while Graph 3 offers its behavior relative to Australia and 
Canada.  
We observe, in first place, a mildly rising trend over the late nineteenth century 
interrupted by cyclical drops, the longest one during the Baring crisis. The Baring crisis 
evidenced the conflict between a high fiscal deficit, the impossibility of maintaining a constant 
exchange rate and a poorly regulated banking system (della Paolera and Taylor, 2001). The lack 
of co-ordination between monetary policy and fiscal policy appear as the factor which, in the 
                                                 
8 We run regressions for Equation 2 of Table 5 with farm investment, non-farm investment and government 
investment instead of total investment rates and the results were highly coincidental with positive and statistically 
significant associations between CIM and each component of total investment. Data for investment components 
comes from Della Paolera and Taylor (2003), Appendix.    
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final analysis, caused the crisis and led to the collapse of the banking system9. This situation led 
to a marked decrease in CIM . 
The turn of the century signaled the beginning of a period of economic recovery and 
political stability under conservative, autocratic governments which lasted until the First World 
War while the expansion of CIM peaked in 1921. In fact, the highest CIM levels in more than 
century under study are to be found in the Interwar years. It should be taken into account that 
until the crisis of the 1930s the free trade policy continued virtually unaltered10. Moreover, 
between 1890 and 1929 Argentina was anchored to the currency board due to the Caja de 
Conversión whose principal mission was to guarantee the currency’s value abroad11. Perhaps 
more important is that the years between 1912, when universal secret ballot was introduced, and 
1930, when a coup d’etat took place, Argentina enjoyed a transition to an open democracy in 
which it had an independent judiciary and a clear separation of powers (Alston and Gallo, 2003).  
CIM decreased in the years following 1934, although its values were still high for another 
decade. This decline occurred at the time the foundations of independent judiciary were eroded as 
the 1930 coup d’etat was condoned by the Supreme Court and followed by electoral fraud which 
paved the way for populism12. This decline in CIM might be also associated with changes in 
macroeconomic policy. The public sector implemented a policy of balance budget after the 
Depression, which required new sources of income and reductions in spending13. Service 
payments on the national debt constituted a large part of public spending. The government 
created a plan which reduced the interest rate payable and extended the repayment period in order 
to reduce these payments14. The change in trade policy would also play its part15. Exchange 
                                                 
9 According to Della Paolera and Taylor (2001), initially the crisis showed the typical symptoms of a traditional 
banking crisis, that is an increase in the amount of cash in the hands of the public, an increase in the banks’ reserves-
deposits ratio and the elimination of some financial institutions, which meant the destruction of deposits. Cf. della 
Paolera and Taylor (2001). P. 68.  
10 According to O’Conell there were few changes in trade policy, while the rest of the world returned to 
protectionism. During the 1920s Argentina continued its free trade policy as a producer of staple goods. The main 
change was the increase in tariffs from 25% to 60% of the official ‘aforo’ values in 1923. O’Conell (1986), p. 91. Cf. 
Di Tella (1986), pp. 122-123.  
11 The return to the gold standard took place in 1899 and, despite leaving it again in 1900, 1914 and 1929, the 
monetary authorities continued to act within its rules (della Paolera and Taylor, 1999).  
12 Cf. Alston and Gallo (2003) for a detailed institutional analysis of the origins of Argentina’s economic decline. 
They emphasize the gap between good economic policies and political short-sightedness of the Conservatives during 
the 1930s. 
13 According to della Paolera and Taylor (1999), the effects of the fiscal decisions taken could have led to contraction 
until 1935 and it cannot be said that a New Deal type policy was practised. 
14 Alhadeff (1986), pp. 96, 107 and 110. According to della Paolera and Taylor (1999), this change of monetary 
policy was vital for Argentina’s recovery as it helped to avoid devastating changes in prices, thus totally 
undermining expectations of deflation and encouraging recovery via increases in spending and investment. 
15 For Di Tella, the 1930 crisis was the watershed between free trade and protection in Argentina, although the main 
change came after the Second World War. Di Tella (1986), p. 128. 
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controls were introduced and the peso was significantly devalued more than once after the 
devaluation of the pound in 1931. Quantitative restrictions were also introduced at this time16.  
Perón’s arrival in 1946 and two consecutive terms of office coincide with a fall of CIM to 
levels similar to those of the last decade of the nineteenth century. The electoral fraud of the 
1930’s leading to a popular disbelief in the rule of law, has been argued, was at the root of 
Colonel Perón’s landslide in the first experience of universal (male and female) suffrage in 
Argentina17. Early Peronism was a period of macroeconomic shocks during which a strategy of 
import substitution industrialization was put into practice. Bilateral trade, exchange control and 
multiple exchange rates were its most important characteristics18. There was also an increase in 
the role of the state which is reflected in the increase in state-owned property, interventionism 
(including control of rents and prices) and higher levels of public spending, mainly financed by 
the inflationary tax19. The expansive macroeconomic policy, which aimed at the redistribution of 
wealth and the increase of spending to finance populist policies, led to inflation. The 
impeachment of the Supreme Court, as it represented an obstacle to populist policies, and the 
introduction of the 1949 Constitution destroyed the separation of powers and implied that 
property rights were no longer maintained through the rule of law (Alston and Gallo (2003). 
CIM did not start its recovery until the late 1960s and it was in the early 1970s that levels 
of 1945 were regained. The sixties saw a policy change which included trying to deal with the 
problems of inflation, public deficit and foreign debt, as well as attempts to open the economy20. 
Perón’s third term of office was characterized by an expansive monetary policy, which resulted in 
an uncontrolled rise in the level of inflation that renders CIM unrepresentative of secure property 
rights21.  
The evolution of Argentina’s CIM relative to Australia’s and Canada’s stress our findings 
and point to the turn of the century and to so called ‘Golden Age’ as the phases in which the gap 
between Argentina and the two other regions of new settlement was wider (Graph 3).  
                                                 
16 Alhadeff (1986), p. 104. 
17 Cf. Alston and Gallo (2003) 
18 Rock (1987) 
19 Di Tella and Dornbusch (1989), chapter 4. 
20 There were attempts to create an atmosphere which was favourable to private capital by the adoption of measures 
to stabilize and liberalize the economy under Frondizi’s presidency and following an agreement with the IMF. 
Exchange rates were unified and many controls, both internal and external, were lifted. Under the Onganía 
dictatorship (1966-1970), a stabilization plan was introduced based on a strict fiscal policy and salary increases 
which were limited to the previous year’s rate of inflation. Exchange controls were also withdrawn at the same time 
(Di Tella and Dornbusch, 1989, pp. 109, 202).  
21 Inflation reached 900% between 1975 and 1976. Cf. Di Tella and Dornbusch (1989). 
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Another way of placing the evolution of CIM into a wider economic context is to compare 
the relative position of each administration in terms of CIM and of other economic indicators 
throughout the more than hundreds years considered (Table 1). These economic indicators 
include a measure of financial development (M2/GDP), an index of macroeconomic and fiscal 
pressure constructed by Della Paolera, Irigoin, and Bózzoli (2003) (which ranks the relative 
improvement achieved by successive governments), and, finally, a ‘reduced’ index of economic 
freedom (RIEF), since its constraint often distorted economic performance in Argentina’s 
history22.  
Actually, high public spending, import substitution, hyperinflation, and large gaps 
between the official and the market exchange rates are restrictions to economic liberty that have 
occasionally featured Argentine economic history. In order to take them into account we have 
constructed a ‘Reduced’ Index of Economic Freedom [henceforth RIEF]23. The components of 
RIEF are, public consumption (Gi) as a proportion of total consumption (Gi/(Gi+Ci)), the 
‘depreciation in the real value of money’ (inflation rate/100+inflation rate), and the weighted 
nominal protection (tariff), to which we added the difference (in logs) between the official 
exchange rate and the market rate (‘black market’). To compute RIEF we have used factorial 
analysis, based on the principal components method, and the results appear in Table 2. The 
variables appear in the first component with positive weightings, which indicates that they are 
inversely related with economic freedom, so we had to multiply the value of each variable by  -1 
to obtain the components’ values in the ‘reduced’ index. RIEF was calculated as a linear 
combination of these four variables, with the shares of the values obtained by factorial analysis 
for each component as a proportion of their total value as their respective weightings24.  
The relative improvement achieved by governments, as captured by CMFPI, offers phases 
of negative correlation with CIM: in 1863-86 (-0.78), which reflects efforts made by governments 
to overcome critical situations, and in 1917-45 (-0.23), which suggests the opposite, as 
governments do not seem to take advantage of the good legacies of previous ones. The positive 
correlation between the indicator of macroeconomic pressure and CIM in 1946-75 (0.56) would 
suggest that governments were unable to change inherited situations. 
                                                 
22 M2/GDP is usually called ‘financial depth’. The administration’s distribution comes from Della Paolera, Irigoin, 
and Bózzoli (2003: 49-51). 
23 This index of economic freedom is reduced in the sense that it does not include other quantitative variables (and 
none of the qualitative variables) that are considered in the Fraser Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, cf. 
Gwartney and Lawson (2003) for a definition and justification of the variables included in the Fraser index.  
24 These weightings are: 0.346 for Gi/(Gi+Ci), 0.318 for Inflation/(100+Inflation), 0.198 for Tariff and 0.137 for 
‘black market’. 
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CIM and RIEF show a strong positive rank correlation up to 1945 (slightly stronger up to 
World War I: 0.99 for 1887-1916 and 0.75 for 1917-1945) while exhibit a negative correlation 
after World War II (-0.28 for 1946-75). Similarly, CIM presents a close association with financial 
development from the early 1890s to World War II (0.82) that weakens in the early twentieth 
century (0.40) to intensify between 1946 and 1975 (0.98). In the long run the association is strong 
and positive (0.73 for 1891-1975, but weaker for 1881-1975). Economic freedom and financial 
development seem, thus, to be associated to institutional stability, especially prior to World War 
II (Graphs 4 and 5). The rise of CIM following military intervention in 1966-73 seems consistent 
with the interpretation of CIM as an indicator of the security of property rights for capital25. 
What does CIM depend on for the historical case of Argentina?. In order to provide an 
answer we use, once again, principal components analysis, relating CIM to those political and 
economic variables which could influence its behavior. In addition to the ‘reduced’ index of 
economic freedom (RIEF), these include the number of changes of government in a given period 
of time (Gobnu); the time at which a change of government (Gobmo) or coup d’état (Coup) takes 
place; an index of ‘financial depth’ (M2/GDP) (Depth); and the nominal interest rate (Interest). 
The results, presented in Table 3, show, for Factor 1, a strong positive association 
between CIM and the degree of financial development (Depth) and economic freedom (RIEF), 
and a negative association with political instability (Gobnu). In summary, economic freedom and  
political and economic stability underlie the changes in ‘Contract-Intensive Money’. As these 
factors increase, the security of property rights, especially for capital, and institutional quality 
would improve.  
 
CIM and economic growth in Argentina  
To what extent did institutional stability influence the economic performance of 
Argentina in the long term? To answer this question we use a structural growth model based on a 
system of simultaneous equations designed to avoid problems of endogeneity.  
Our starting point is a conventional growth equation in which the rate of variation of real 
product per head is dependent on GDP per capita in the initial period, on the average rate of 
change of active population over the time span considered (as an indicator of labor growth), on 
the average enrolment rate in primary and secondary education, lagged one period (to represent 
the growth of human capital), on the average rate of investment, lagged one period (as an 
                                                 
25 Clague et al. (1999: 195-6) find in some instances an association between CIM increases and the arrival to power 
of strong military dictatorships.  
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approximate measure of physical capital growth) and, finally, on the average rate of variation of 
exports as a proportion of GDP (to indicate how openness evolved over each period). 
Investment rate, however, is considered as an endogenous variable whose behavior is 
specified in a second equation depending on real interest rate, on the relative price of capital 
goods, on the average rate of variation of the dependency rate (that is, the ratio of population 
above 15 and below 65 years and population ages 15 to 64) and on institutional stability, 
represented by CIM. 
Similarly, the relative price of capital goods is considered to be endogenous and, in a third 
equation, its evolution is expressed as a function of the initial level of GDP per head, and on the 
degree of economic freedom, measured by RIEF.  
Finally, in a fourth equation, CIM is endogeneized as a function of those variables that 
load more heavily in Factor 1 of Principal Components Analysis: economic freedom (RIEF), 
financial development (Depth), and the number of changes of government in a given period of 
time (Gobnu). 
All variables have been expressed in twenty year moving averages in order to smooth out 
the series and avoid bias which could result from the annual fluctuations. To estimate the system 
of equations we have employed three-stage least squares which uses instrumental variables to 
correct possible problems of endogeneity and double causality. This method also solves the 
problem of contemporary correlation between the residuals of the equations. The chosen method 
of estimation combines, therefore, the advantages of two-stage estimation and those of the SUR 
method. Unfortunately, quantitative evidence is not available for each independent variables 
throughout the considered period and this fact has conditioned the model’s testing (see Sources in 
the Appendix).  
The values of the above variables, their averages and standard deviations are shown in 
Table 4. The econometric results are presented in Table 5. We can observe that all variables have 
the expected sign and level of significance. In effect, the initial level of GDP per capita is 
negative and significant which suggests that the economy’s growth potential is inversely related 
to its starting point. Consequently, an increase of 10 percent in the initial level of output per head 
would represent in model (3) a 0.3 percent [0.1*(-0.06/(1-0.98))= -0,3] decline in the rate of 
growth of real per capita GDP. The rate of variation of product per person is positively associated 
to that of the active population and an increase of one standard deviation would increase output 
growth by 0.5 percent. Economic growth is also directly and significantly related with investment 
and schooling rates. An increase of 10 percent in the rate of investment would represent, one 
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period later, an increase of 1.5 percent in per capita GDP growth; the same increase in rate of 
primary and secondary enrolment, one period later, would increase the rate of growth by 0.4 
percent. Lastly, an increase of standard deviation in the openness rate of variation would provoke 
a rise of 0.1 percent in the rate of economic growth [0.0053*(0.393/(1-0.98))=0.104].  
From the second equation we can conclude that the higher the real interest rate, the 
relative price of investment goods (in terms of consumer goods) and the dependency rate, the 
lower the proportion of GDP dedicated to capital formation, while the higher the value of CIM, 
the higher the investment rate. In other words, if the real interest rate, the relative price of capital 
goods or the annual variation of the dependency rate decreased by one standard deviation, the 
rate of investment would rise by 1.1, 3.4, and 0.7 percent, respectively. In turn, an increase of 10 
percent in CIM, would rise the rate of investment by 6,4 percent. Thus, institutional stability, as 
captured by CIM, seems to be a major determinant of capital formation in Argentina. Moreover, 
such results tend to support the view that attributes the low rate of accumulation to the high 
dependency rate in the ‘age of mass migration’ (Taylor, 1992); Taylor and Williamson, 1994) 
and to the high relative prices of capital goods, after 1930 (Taylor, 1994, 1998). However, the 
idea that the relative price of capital goods did not have a clear effect on the demand for 
investment, as the government could influence this via monetary policy and public investment, 
does not find support in our statistical exercise26.  
In the third equation, the relative price of investment goods is negatively correlated with 
the ‘reduce’ index of economic freedom and with the initial level of GDP per head. Thus, an 
increase of RIEF by one standard deviation represents a reduction of 10.5 percent in the relative 
price of capital goods. In turn, a 10 percent increase in the initial level of output per head would 
represent a 0.6 percent decline in the relative price of capital goods. Hence, as the economy 
grows and liberalizes, the relative price of capital goods will fall. 
Finally, in the fourth equation, CIM is inversely correlated with the number of 
government changes in a given period (Gobnu), and positively related with economic freedom 
and financial development. Thus, the marginal impact of a one standard deviation increase in 
‘Gobnu’ would reduce CIM by 5.6 percent [1.854*(-0.012/(1-1.922+0.926))= -5.56], while one 
standard deviation increase in ‘financial depth’ and in RIEF would rise CIM by 12.3 and 11.9 
percent, respectively.     
                                                 
26 Díaz Alejandro (1965), p. 25. 
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All in all, the results of the estimated system of equations suggest that in Argentina 
institutional stability and security of property rights, as measure by CIM, together with lower 
relative price of capital goods, historically associated to economic freedom, would lead to higher 
rates of investment and growth.  
 
Concluding Remarks: A Counterfactual Proposition  
This paper has analyzed the causes of Argentina’s backwardness using a structural model 
which incorporates institutional stability in the form of the CIM indicator. The results obtained 
show that in Argentina, institutional instability hindered investment and, in consequence, 
economic growth. 
We also know, from a comparison of CIM levels in Argentina with those of Australia and 
Canada, that, historically, in Argentina, economic agents have had less confidence in the 
institutional framework (Graph 3). In fact, the average value for Argentina is 0.67, compared 
with an average of 0.86 for the other two nations (computed for 1863-1974). This corresponds 
with a lower rate of investment, 13.5 percent of GDP in Argentina compared with an average of 
20 percent for Australia and Canada (computed for 1885-1974). 
So, we could wonder what would have happened if property rights had been better 
defined and enforced in Argentina? Would Argentina have caught up with Australia and Canada 
in terms of material welfare? 
We propose, then, a counterfactual exercise which illustrates CIM’s contribution to 
investment and, indirectly, to growth: What would have been the effects on rate of investment 
and, indirectly, on per capita GDP growth if a stable proportion, in terms of CIM, had been 
maintained between Argentina and Australia and Canada. We, then, simulate that Argentina’s 
CIM value relative to Canada in 1882, a 0.622 ratio of, had remained unchanged during the 
period 1883-1916. We repeat the exercise for the period 1944-71, using the CIM relative to 
Canada for 1943 (0.776).  
The result of this counterfactual exercise indicates that, ceteris paribus, a higher value of 
CIM would have led to a higher rate of investment which, in turn, would have increased 
Argentina’s rate of growth (Table 6). For the period 1883-1916, a higher level of CIM would 
have increased the investment rate from 10.9 up to 20.2 percent which would have boosted the 
rate of economic growth from 1.4 to 4.6 percent per year. The simulation for the period 1944-
1971 suggests that a higher CIM would have led to an increase in the rate of investment (from 
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22.1 to 23.5) and, indirectly, to a rise in the growth rate of product per capita from 1.4 to 2.1 
percent. 
It is clear that a higher level of CIM would have allowed Argentina to partially close the 
gap, in terms of GDP per capita, which separated it from Australia and Canada (Table 7). In fact, 
for the period 1883-1916, Argentina would have overcome Australia’s product per person instead 
of representing only 70 percent of it and would have had a significantly higher standard of living 
than Canada. For the period between 1944 and 1971, the results of the simulation indicate that 
GDP in Argentina would have been nearly two-thirds of the levels in Australia and Canada, 
instead of only one-half.  
This quantitative exercise leads us to the conclusion that, in an improved institutional 
framework Argentina would have reduced the gap with Australia and Canada.  
 15 
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Graph 1. Argentina’s Relative GDP per Head, 1875-2001    (differences in logs) 
(U.S. Relative Prices) [$ 1913, 1875-1939; $ 1980, 1940-2001] 
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Table 1. CIM, CMFPI, RIEF, and M2/GDP: Comparative Ranking, 1863-1975 
 
Years Administration  CIM CMFPI RIEF M2/GDP 
        
1863/68 Mitre   22 1  
1869/74 Sarmiento   23 6  
1875/80 Avellaneda   26 4  
1881/86 Roca   15 12  10 
1887/90 Juárez Celman  24 24 9 1 
1891/92 Pellegrini   25 10 10 16 
1893/98 Sáenz Peña, L./Uriburu, J.E. 17 21 7 17 
1899/1904 Roca   13 2 6 15 
1905/10 Quintana/Figueroa Alcorta 10 13 5 14 
1911/16 Sáenz Peña, de la Plaza  8 17 3 13 
1917/22 Yrigoyen   1 7 1 5 
1923/28 De Alvear   4 22 2 7 
1929/30 Yrigoyen   3 25 4 4 
1931 Uriburu   2 11 8 2 
1932/37 Justo   5 8 12 8 
1938/42 Ortiz/Castillo  6 20 13 11 
1943/45 Ramírez/Farrell  7 18 11 3 
1946/51 Perón   12 5 14 6 
1952/55 Perón II   18 9 15 9 
1956/57 Aramburu   14 14 20 12 
1958/61 Frondizi   19 19 19 18 
1962/63 Guido   21 26 16 22 
1964/66 Illia   20 15 18 23 
1967/69 Onganía   11 3 17 20 
1970/72 Levingston/Lanusse  16 23 21 21 
1973/75 Perón III   9 16 22 19 
 
CMFPI: Combined Classical Macroeconomic and Fiscal Pressure Indices 
RIEF: ‘Reduced’ Index of Economic Freedom 
M2/GDP: Financial Depth 
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Table 2.  
Principal Components Analysis to Construct the ‘Reduced’ Index of Economic Freedom 
 Public Consumption/Total Consumption Real Depreciation of Money Weighted Nominal Protection ‘Black market’ 
Factor 1 0.959 0.883 0.549 0.381 
Factor 2 0.040 0.030 -0.694 0.830 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  
Principal Components Analysis of CIM  determinants  
 RIEF CIM Interest DEPTH GOBNU GOBMO COUP 
Factor 1 0.803 0.662 -0.478 0.785 -0.850 0.432 -0.377 
Factor 2 0.311 0.539 0.643 0.157 0.035 0.649 0.296 
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Graph 2: The Evolution of CIM in Argentina, 1863-1974 
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Graph 3. Argentina’s Relative CIM, 1863-1974 (differences in logs) 
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              Graph 4. The Evolution of  CIM and RIEF, 1884-1974 
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              Graph 5. The Evolution of  CIM and M2/GDP, 1884-1974 
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Table 4.  Variables in the Model: Average and Standard Deviation 
 
 Variables 
 
Average  
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Per Capita GDP Growth  
 
Initial GDP per capita (in logs) 
 
Active Population Growth 
 
Primary and Secondary Enrolment 
 
Investment Rate 
 
Real Interest Rate 
 
Dependency Rate (Rate of Variation) 
 
Relative Price of Capital Goods 
 
CIM 
 
RIEF 
 
Openness (Rate of Variation) 
 
Financial Depth 
 
Number of Government Changes  
 
0.016 
(0.013) 
1.265 
(0.461) 
0.011 
(0.004) 
0.399 
(0.132) 
0.147 
(0.055) 
-0.179 
(0.413) 
0.011 
(0.002) 
-0.054 
 (0.095) 
0.723 
(0.073) 
-0.173 
(0.731) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
0.388 
(0.084) 
5.017 
(1.854) 
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Table 5. Econometric Model 
                                                (1)                        (2)                      (3) 
Variables Coefficient (t stat) Coefficient (t stat) Coefficient (t stat) 
Equation I  
(Dependent: Per capita GDP growth) 
Initial GDP per capita (in logs) 
Active Population Growth 
Investment (-1) 
Primary and Secondary Enrolment (-1) 
Openness (Rate of Variation) 
AR(1) 
 
R2-Adj. 
DW 
 
 
-0.054 (-12.61) 
 2.193 (4.13) 
 0.230 (4.99) 
 0.072 (2.97) 
 
 0.951 (21.56) 
 
0.906 
2.015 
 
 
-0.054 (-12.61) 
 2.187 (4.11) 
 0.234 (5.066) 
 0.071 (2.909) 
  
 0.952 (21.72) 
 
0.906 
2.015 
 
 
-0.060 (-13.18) 
 2.538 (4.35) 
 0.292 (5.97) 
 0.073 (2.31) 
 0.393 (3.23) 
 0.980 (28.56) 
 
0.900 
1.886 
Equation II  
(Dependent: Investment Rate) 
Constant 
Real Interest Rate 
Relative Price of Capital Goods 
CIM  
Dependency Rate (Rate of Variation) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
 
R-adj 
DW 
 
 
-0.296 (-6.11) 
-0.023 (-5.57) 
-0.307 (-2.45) 
 0.617 (20.85) 
 
 1.946 (45.19) 
-0.953 (-22.59) 
 
0.998 
2.086 
 
 
-0.123 (-2.448) 
-0.019 (-4.98) 
-0.346 (-2.99) 
 0.431 (13.74) 
-2.262 (-2.07) 
 1.926 (39.84) 
-0.933 (-19.67) 
 
0.998 
1.993 
 
 
-0.137 (-2.64) 
-0.019 (-5.06) 
-0.347 (-2.97) 
 0.448 (14.16) 
-2.227 (-2.02) 
 1.926 (40.45) 
-0.933 (-19.98) 
 
0.998 
2.001 
Equation III  
(Dependent: Relative Price of Capital Goods) 
Initial GDP per capita (in logs)  
RIEF (-1) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
 
R-adj 
DW 
 
 
-0.006 (-2.03) 
-0.075 (-53.80) 
 1.936 (29.84) 
-0.940 (-14.68) 
 
0.998 
1.865 
 
 
-0.006 (-2.12) 
-0.071 (51.59) 
 1.939 (30.00) 
-0.944 (-14.85) 
 
0.998 
1.864 
 
 
-0.007 (-2.13) 
-0.072 (-51.62) 
 1.938 (29.98) 
-0.943 (-14.84) 
 
0.998 
1.863 
Equation IV 
(Dependent: CIM) 
Constant 
RIEF  
Financial Depth 
GOBNU(-1) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
 
R-Adj 
DW 
 
 
0.705 (2.09) 
0.070 (31.10) 
0.567 (32.98) 
-0.012 (-10.23) 
 1.926 (42.52) 
-0.928 (-19.74) 
 
0.998 
1.891 
 
 
0.604 (5.17) 
0.057 (24.95) 
 0.603 (34.55) 
-0.013 (-10.84) 
 1.929 (44.23) 
-0.933 (-20.61) 
 
0.999 
1.847 
 
 
0.635 (3.99) 
0.065 (28.43) 
 0.584 (33.55) 
-0.012 (-10.47) 
 1.922 (42.95) 
-0.9256 (-19.91) 
 
0.998 
1.856 
 
Instruments used in regressions 
Equation 1: constant, Hodrick-Prescott trend of the dependent variable, GDP per capita, GDP 
per capita(-1), rate of variation of active population, rate of variation of active population(-1), 
primary and secondary enrolment, primary and secondary enrolment(-1), CIM, CIM(-1) 
Equation 2: constant, Hodrick-Prescott trend of the dependent variable, GDP per capita, GDP 
per capita(-1), ‘black market’, ‘black market’(-1), RIEF, RIEF(-1), rate of variation of active 
population, rate of variation of active population(-1), relative price of capital goods,  
relative price of capital goods(-1)  
 30 
Equation 3: constant, Hodrick-Prescott trend of the dependent variable, ‘black market’, ‘black 
market’(-1), ‘black market’(-2) 
Equation 4: constant, Hodrick-Prescott trend of the dependent variable, GDP per capita, GDP 
per capita(-1), GDP per capita(-2), ‘black market’, ‘black market’(-1) 
 
 
 
Table 6.  Simulation*: Actual and Counterfactual Values (%) 
 
 Investment Rate  Per Capita GDP Growth 
 Actual (Counterfactual) Actual (Counterfactual) 
1883-1916 10.9    (20.2) 1.4   (4.6) 
1944-1971 22.1   (23.5) 1.4   (2.1) 
* Simulations carried out with Model 3 of Table 5. 
 
Table 7. Argentina’s Relative GDP per capita: Actual and Counterfactual Values* (%) 
                    
 Australia = 100 Canada = 100 
 Actual (Counterfactual) Actual (Counterfactual) 
1883-1916 70 (114) 103 (148) 
1944-1971 54  (69)  48  (62) 
* Simulations carried out with Model 3 of Table 5. 
 
   
 
